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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTIpN
The Decree of Divorce forming the basis
was

for

this

appeal

entered May 12, 1987, in the Sixth Judicial District Court

of the State of Utah and constitutes a final judgment
term

is

defined

in

Rule

54

of

the

Utah

as

that

Rules of Civil

Procedure.
A Notice of Appeal meeting the requirements of Rule
the

3

of

Rules of Court of Appeals was timely filed within the time

allowed by Rule 4, and all the required fees have been paid.

Jurisdiction
78-2(a)-3(g)

is conferred

and

Section

under the provisions

of

Section

30-3-7 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as

amended).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Donald
Jefferies,

Lloyd
ag&

Jefferies

37. Eva

is

the

father

of

Joycelyn

Louise Jefferies is her mother. Mr.

Jefferies files this appeal seeking review of the child support
provisions of a Decree of Divorce which dissolved the
between

the

parties

to

this

receivable to the child.
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action

marriage

and awarded a contract

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The following issues are presented for review:
1.

Does the

ownership

of

trial

a

court

marital

have

asset

jurisdiction

from

to

remove

litigating parties in a

divorce proceeding and award it to a child of the marriage?
2.

Was the

Liability

for

criteria

forth

in

the

Uniform

Civil

Support Act Section 78-45-7 Utah Code Annotated

(1953 as amended)
determining

set

properly

applied

by

the

trial

court

in

and awarding child support for Joycelyn Jefferies,

an adult daughter of the litigating parties?
DETERMIN1T1VE STATUTES
Page
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-45-7

8,9,10,11,
14

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from a final judgment and Decree of Divorce
entered in

the

Sixth

Judicial

District

Court

County, State of Utah by the Honorable Don V.
1987.

Particularly,

this

appeal

Sanpete

Tibbs on May 12,

questions

distribution and child support provisions of

for

said

the

property

Decree

and

particularly the removal by the Court from the marital assets
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of

a

balance

owing

to

the parties under a Real Estate Sale

Contract and giving it to an

adult

daughter

whom

the

Court

found to be incompetent to care for herself.
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL
The

case

was tried to the Court on April 23, 1987, Mrs.

Jefferies presented evidence that the child was incompetent and
argued that certain of the parties accumulated assets should be
distributed to that daughter, (Transcript, P.59). Mr. Jefferies
is before this Court questioning the jurisdiction of the
to

do

that.

He

is

not

Court

challenging his responsibilities to

support the child if the trial court's determination

that

she

is incompetent is upheld.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On

January

16, 1943, Donald L.

Jefferies were married.
(T.4),

the

Jefferies

Jefferies and Eva Louise

(T.4). During the 44 years of marriage
had

as

issue

to

children, Bill, Wesley, Mariane, and Joy.

the

marriage

four

(T.58-59).

The youngest of the four children, Joy, is emotionally and
academically

slow

third grade level.

in

that

she

(T.59).
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functions on approximately a

At the time the Court below entered the Decree of Divorce,
Joycelyn Jefferies was 37 years of age.
Several years prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce,
Donald

and

Eva

Jefferies

operated

an

antique

store

in

partnership with Tom and Sue Sego. (T.7-8). Prior to the filing
for

divorce,

the

Plaintiff

Eva

antique shop to find Don Jefferies
antique

Jefferies
and

Sue

would
Sego

go to the
inside

the

shop with the door locked and refused to open the shop

until they were ready.

(T.63).

On occasion, Don Jefferies and

Sue Sego would take off together in

the

afternoons

and

just

close-up the antique shop. (T.63-64). When Plaintiff confronted
Don Jefferies prior to the time he left, Don indicated that the
relationship
(T.64).
some

44

with

Sue

Sego

had been going on for two years.

Although Plaintiff and Defendant had been married
years,

for

the Defendant's leaving which culminated in a

Decree of Divorce was not the first time in which Don Jefferies
had left his wife, Eva

Jefferies,

and

family.

Twelve

years

prior to these precedings, the Defendant Don Jefferies left Eva
without notice and was apart from Eva for approximately four or
five

weeks.

(T.62)

The Defendant's motivation in leaving Eva

Jefferies involved a relationship with another

-4-

woman.

(T.62).

At

the

these

time,

Don

precedings,

Jefferies
he

left some twelve years prior to

indicated

to

Eva

that

all

of

the

properties and possessions of Don and Eva's were to be given to
Eva and in fact the necessary ownership papers were transferred
into Eva!s name.
The

final

(T.64).
time

in

which

Mr.

Jefferies left, he again

reiterated that he did not want a thing and that Eva could have
it all.

(T.64).

Mr.

Jefferies leaving was unannounced to Eva

and essentially abandoned Eva with the
business

responsibility

of

the

and for the support of their dependent daughter, Joy.

(T.64).
Not only did Don Jefferies fail to
but

announce

his

leaving

he secluded himself purposefully so that Eva Jefferies nor

his family could get in touch with him.

(T.9).

A few days subsequent to his leaving,
Jefferies

met

Jefferies.

Sue

the

Defendant

Don

Sego who is some 28 years younger than Mr.

(T.46).

Mr.

Jefferies and Sue Sego and two of Sue

Sego's children traveled to

Oregon

where

they

have

resided

since that time.
Not

only

has

Mr.

should be left to Eva

Jefferies indicated that all property

Jefferies
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but

Mr.

Jefferies

has

not

pursued

any

means

of providing for or assisting Joy with the

necessities for which she is in need of.
Mr.
has

Jefferies recognizes that throughout Joy's

been

under

employment

for

any

employment has been sporadic.
In fact, Mr.
Oregon

in

wife

period

has
of

Jefferies

oldest

time

son,

unable

and

to

that her

Bill,

traveled

to

order to reach some resolution as to the properties

should

have

When asked if he had

all

of the properties, Mr.

indicated that he probably did so state/
Aside from the pieces
marriage,

been

(T.5).

acquired during the marriage.
his

she

the care of a family member and that although

she has held jobs from time to time, Joy
maintain

life

Mr.

Jefferies'

social security and

of

property

monthly

approximately

said

that

Jefferies

(T.ll).
acquired

during

the

income consists of $487.00
$300.00

per

month

as

an

employee of Personal Property Management. Aside from the social
security and the monthly payment indicated, the only income Mr.
Jefferies

receives in which he could contribute to support his

dependent daughter, Joy, is the income received from the
pieces of property obtained during the marriage.
addition, Mr.

seven

(T.41-42). In

Jefferies has indicated that he has no desire to
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attempt

to

increase

his

sources of livelihood.
One
marriage

of

the

was

or

tp

look to alternative

(T.46).

parcels

the

income

of

property

acquired

during

El Rancho Motel located at 1105 South State

Street, Provo, Utah.

By Warranty Deed dated August

10, 1986,

the Jefferies sold the motel to William Pfcul Esplin.
to

the

terms

of

the

contract,

there

is

approximately $178,655.00 yet to be paid On said
accordingly

the

According

outstanding

property

and

payments of $1,385.00 per month are to be paid for

another 28.9 years.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions

paragraph

trial

7.)

The

court

of

Law

awarded the proceeds of said

contract to Joycelyn Jefferies to provide for her

support

and

maintenance.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Jefferies is appealing the decision of the trial court
claiming that the Court below arbitrarily determined the amount
of

child

support

to

be

awarded to Joycelyn Jefferies.

The

Transcript from the proceedings below adequately indicates that
the necessary factors in determining an
child

support

were

considered

and

a

appropriate
reasonable

provided for to assure that Joycelyn Jefferies was
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award

of

award was
taken

care

of and would not become an award of the state.
In order to assure that the support payments were provided
for,

the

certain

Court

properly

property

determined

obtained

during

that

the

the proceeds from

marriage

should

go

directly to Joycelyn Jefferies for her support.
ARGUMENT
The

Focus of Mr.

Jefferiesf Brief asserts that the trial

court arbitrarily determined the amount of child
secondly,

that

support

and,

the trial court removed a major asset from the

marital property for payment of the child support. It should be
noted initially

that

Mr.

Jefferies

does

not

contend

that

support is needed for his daughter, Joycelyn.
POINT I
THE TRANSCRIPT DEMONSTRATES THAT ALL RELEVANT FACTORS
WERE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND THAT THE DECISION OF
THE TRIAL JUDGE WILL NOT BE DISTURBED ABSENT A CLEAR
ERROR OF JUDGMENT.
Mr.
78-45-7

Jefferies correctly cites Utah Code Annotated Section
as

a

non-exclusive

list

of

factors

Legislature has set out as guidelines for the
consider
given.

in

determining

the

amount

of

in

trial

court

to

child support to be

The Legislature prefaces the list of factors
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which the

with

the

following language:
The Court in determining the amount of prospective
support, shall
consider
all
relevant
factors
including but not limited to. . . (Emphasis added.)
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-45-7(2).
As

set out in statute, the trial court is to consider all

relevant factors in determining the amount, of child support.
The appropriate standard of review by the Court of Appeals
in determining whether the trial court decided
child

support

properly

is

set

out

the

amount

of

by the Supreme Court in

Bernard vs. Attebury, 629 P.2d 892 at 894, 895 (Utah 1981).
This Court will not disturb the trial
court f s
exercise of discretion unless we form a definite and
firm conviction that the Court below committed a
clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached
upon a weighing of the relevant factors.
Trial judges have been vested with considerable discretion
in determining the amount of support necessary for
such as Joycelyn Jefferies.
relevant

factors

individuals

The trial judge is to consider all

in the particular facts and circumstances of

the case presented to him and from what he considers to be
relevant
money.

factors,

he

the

is to determine an appropriate award of

In light of the broad discretion
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given

to

the

trial

judge,

his decision will not be reversed absent a "clear error

of judgment." See Bernard supra.
Given that the trial
discretion,

there

is

judge

not

a

has

Utah

discusses all of the factors set out
Section 78-45-7(2).
weight

to

be

been

given

Supreme
in

Utah

such

broad

Court case which
Code

Annotated

The statute does not dictate the amount of

given

each

of

the factors listed and further

indicates that the list is not exclusive and, therefore,
may

be

other

relevant

factors

weight than the factors listed.

which

there

bear equal or greater

Each Judge in

his

discretion

places his own weight of importance on each of the factors.
The

focal

point

of

the

judge's

towards the person in need of support.

concerns are directed

Consequently, the trial

judge is concerned primarily with a standard of living in which
the child or dependent person has become accustomed

to

living

and the needs of that child in the future.
The

Utah Supreme Court has indicated with regard to child

custody and support proceedings:
In reviewing child custody and support proceedings,
we accord substantial difference to the trial court's
findings
and
give
it considerable latitude in
fashioning the appropriate relief. We will
not
disturb that Court's actions unless the evidence
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clearly preponderates to the contrary
been an abuse of discretion.

or

there

has

Woodward vs. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 at 394 (Utah 1985).
In

short,

the

fact

alone

that the Transcripts may not

indicate explicitly that the trial judge $id not consider every
factor outlined in 78-45-7 does not establish that the award of
child support is arbitrary or unjust so long as this Court does
not find that the ruling by the trial judge
discretion

and

was

an

abuse

of

that the evidence clearlly preponderates to the

contrary.
Even in light of the
trial

judge,

broad

discretion

placed

with

the

a reading of the Transcript establishes that all

of the factors identified in 78-45-7(2) were in fact before the
Court and considered.
relative

wealth

to

the

the

and income of the parties is well established

in the Transcript.
offered

The relative standard of living and

Plaintiff's exhibits 1

and

2

which

were

Court outlining the Financial Declarations of

the parties as well as the summary of real estate and contracts
owned by the parties to this action. Beginning on page 17, line
7,

of

the

Transcript

counsel

for

Mrs.

Eva

Jefferies

interrogates Mr. Jefferies at length as to his income, physical
condition,

and

beginning

on

-11-

page

19,

line

19, of the

Transcript, Mr.

Jefferies presents extensive testimony

as

to

the property which was owned of the marriage and his opinion as
to the values thereof. Further, beginning on page 25, line 6 of
the Transcript, Mr.
property

Jefferies is questioned about his personal

and the value thereof.

counsel for

Mr.

Jefferies

Beginning on page 28, line 8,

further

cross-examines

him

with

regard to his holdings in property and personal property.
Beginning

on

page

64,

Transcript, Eva Jefferies is

line

23

questioned

of

the

with

trial court's
regard

to

the

properties owned of the marriage.
With

Jefferies1 ability to earn, page 17,

respect to Mr.

beginning on line 8 outlines Mr.
and

his

intentions

as

Jefferies1 income

to future employment.

well

as

the

Transcript.

properties

assignment of the contract to Mr.

daughter are fully set out
Joycelyn's

in

the

ability

subsequent

to

earn

is

month

Aside from Mr.

Jefferies1 monthly employment, the income producing
as

per

Jefferies

pages

of

the

fully

set out

beginning on page 59, line 18 in which Mrs. Jefferies indicates
that Joycelyn is emotionally and academically slow,
to

obtain

employment

as

a

result

of

her

is

unable

condition and,

consequently, it is necessary for the Court to provide for

-12-

her

support.
The

trial

support in

court

the

also considered the need for Joycelyn's

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions

of

Law,

paragraphs 6 and 7.
The

respective

ages

of

the

parties are set out in the

Transcript. On page 4, line 17, Mr. Jefferies indicates his age
as 68.

On page 57, line 17 of the

indicates

that

as

Transcript,

Eva

Jefferies

of the date of the Transcript, she was 68.

Finally, on page 59, lines 16 and 17 as

JoycelynTs

indicated,

age is 37.
There
Jefferies

is
is

no

indication

obligated

for

in

the

the

Transcript

support

of

that Mr.

any

other

individuals.
Contrary to the assertions of Mr. Jefferies, the Court had
all

of the relevant information before it at the time in which

it made its determination with regard to

the

support

of

Jefferies' daughter, Joycelyn.
POINT II
PURSUANT TO THE TRIAL COURTS CONTINUING JURISDICTION
THE LEGISLATURE HAS PROVIDED FOR FUTURE CONTINGENCIES
RELATING TO CHILD SUPPORT

-13-

the

Implicit

in

the

statute

is

the

mechanism

to make

adjustments and alterations to the award of money based upon
substantial change of circumstances.
of

Mr.

a

Contrary to the assertion

Jefferies in which he claims that the decision is very

inflexible and does not make provisions for possible changes in
the future, the

legislature

has

specifically

addressed

and

provided for such contingencies.
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-45-7(1) states:
Prospective support shall be equal to the amount
granted by prior Court Order unless there has been a
material change of circumstances on the part of the
obligor or obligee.
The Legislature has granted
jurisdiction
which Mr.
improvement

to

the

trial

court

continuing

resolve future contingencies such as those of

Jefferies places concern, i.e.
or

her

untimely

death.

Joycelyn's
(See

page

possible
9

of Mr.

Jefferies1 Brief.)
POINT III
THE ASSIGNMENT OF THE CONTRACT TO JOYCELYN ASSURES
PAYMENT FOR HER SUPPORT
The trial court
necessary

for

in

Joycelyn's

determining
needs

-14-

the

amount

of

support

concluded that the amount of

$1,385.00 per month was necessary to meet her needs.
court further ordered that the payments receivable
property

owned

Joycelynfs

by

Joycelyn to assure that her
effect,

the

assignment

requiring Mr.
$1,385.00

support

of

Jefferies to

per

month.

parents

the

payment

trial court's
dependent

person

by

certain

be conveyed to
were

made.

In

pay

to

Joycelyn

the

amount

of

It is also a well accepted practice for

of

primary

payments

on

the proceeds is no different than

the trial court to assign an amount
insure

would

The trial

of

a

child support.
concern

is

for

parent's

wages

to

As set out supra, the
the

support

of

the

ordering the assignment of the proceeds,

the trial court has merely insured the payment of her support.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing facts both
facts

presented

Transcript
respectfully

and

before
the

requests

the

trial

authorities
this

with

court

regard

to

the

as outlined in the

cited,

Eva

Jefferies

Court to affirm the trial court's

decision in awarding the proceeds from the sale of the property
to be

distributed

directly

to

support.
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Joycelyn

Jefferies

for

her

RESPECTFULLY

SUBMITTED

this °|

day of

1987.

RICHARD B. JOHNSC
Attorney for Respondent
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
certify
that
on
the
y
day
of
,
1987,
I
mailed
a
true
and
correct
copy
of
QcXgC
H4_
oregoing, postage prepaid, to:
the for
hereby

Mr. Noall T. Wootton
Attorney for Appellant
P.O. Box 310
American Fork, Utah 84003
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Every w o m a n shall support her child; a n d she
shall support her husband when he is in need.
1957
78-45-4.1 Duty of stepparent to support stepchild
- Effect of termination of marriage or common
law relationship.
A stepparent shall support a stepchild to the same
extent that a natural or adoptive parent is required
to support a child. Provided, however, that upon
the termination of the marriage or common law
relationship between the stepparent and the child's
natural or adoptive parent the support obligation
shall terminate.
two
78-45-4.2. Natural or adoptive parent has
primary obligation of support - Right of
stepparent to recover support.
Nothing contained herein shall act to relieve the
natural parent or adoptive parent of the primary
obligation of support; furthermore, a stepparent has
the same right to recover support for a stepchild
from the natural or adoptive parent as any other
obligee.
1979
78-45-4.3. Ward of state - Primary obligation to
support.
Notwithstanding section 78-45-2, a natural or
an adoptive parent or stepparent whose minor child
has become a ward of the state is not relieved of the
primary obligation to support that child until he
reaches the age of majority.
19*3
78-45-5. Duty of obligor regardless of presence or
residence of obligee.
An obligor present or resident in this state has the
duty of support as defined in this act regardless of
the presence or residence of the obligee.
1957
78-45-6. District court jurisdiction.
The district court shall have jurisdiction of all
proceedings brought under this act.
1957
78-45-7. Determination of amount of support Assessment formula for temporary support.
(1) Prospective support shall be equal t o the
a m o u n t granted by prior court order unless there
has been a material change of circumstance on the
part of the obligor or obligee.
(2) When n o prior court order exists, or a material change in circumstances has occurred, the court
in determining the amount of prospective support,
shall consider all relevant factors including but not
limited to:
(a) the standard of living a n d situation of the
parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the
parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor t o earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee t o earn;
(e) the need of the obligee;
(0 the age of the parties;
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the
support of others.
(3) W h e n n o prior court order exists, t h e court
shall determine and assess all arrearages based u p o n ,
but not limited t o :
(a) the amount of public assistance received by
the obligee, if any;
(b) the funds that have been reasonably and
necessarily expended in support of spouse and children.
(4) In determining the amount of prospective
support on an ex parte or other motion for temporary suoDort, the court shall use a uniform statewide

can be readily identified &nd shall allow for reasonable deductions from tne obligor's earnings for
taxes, work related expenses, and living expenses
The assessment formula shall be established by the
Department of Social Services and periodically reviewed by the Judicial Council under Subsection 78.
3-21(3).
l9u
78-45-7.1. Medical and dental expenses of
dependent children - Assigning responsibility for
payment - Insurance coverage.
When n o prior court order exists or the prior
court order makes n o specific provision for the
payment of medical a n d dental expenses for dependent children, the court shall include in its order a
provision assigning responsibility for the payment of
reasonable and necessary medical a n d dental expenses for the dependent children. If coverage is available at a reasonable cost, t h e court may also
include a provision requiring the purchase and
maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and
dental care insurance for those children.
i*4
78-45-8. Continuing jurisdiction.
The court shall retain jurisdiction t o modify or
vacate the order of support where justice requires.
1957

78-45-9. Enforcement of right of support.
(1) T h e obligee m a y enforce his right of support
against the obligor and t h e state department of
social services m a y proceed pursuant t o this act or
any other applicable statute, either o n its own behalf
or o n behalf of the obligee, t o enforce the obligee's
right of support against the obligor. Whenever any
court action is commenced b y t h e state department
of social services t o Enforce payment of the
obligor's support obligation, it shall be the duty of
the attorney general or tpe county attorney, of the
county of residence of thfe obligee, t o represent that
department.
(2) No obligee shall commence any action to
recover support due or 0wing that obligee whether
under this act or any other applicable statute
without first filing an affidavit with the court at the
time the action is commenced stating whether that
obligee has received public assistance from any
source. If the obligee ha$ received public assistance,
the obligee shall join the department of social services as a party plaintiff in the action. The department of social services shall be represented as provided in subsection (1) of tlhis section.
\m
78-45-9.1. Repealed.
I*M
78-45-9.2. County attorney to assist obligee.
The county attorney's office shall provide assistance t o an obligee desiring t o proceed under this act
in the following manner:
(1) Provide forms, approved by t h e judicial
council of Utah, for an 6rder of wage assignment if
the obligee is not represented by legal counsel;
(2) T h e county attorney's office m a y charge a fee
not to exceed $25 for providing assistance t o an
obligee under subsection (1).
(3) Inform the obligee of t h e right t o file impecuniously if the obligee is unable t o bear t h e expenses
of the action and assist the obligee with such filing;
(4) Advise the obliged of t h e available methods
for service of process; anq
(5) Assist the obligee in expeditiously scheduling a
hearing before the court.
i* 3
78-45-10. Appeals.
Anneals mav be taken from orders a n d judgments
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1. Criminal Law @=»1216(2)
Requirement of U.C.A.1953, 76-3401(1) that sentences shall run concurrently
unless court states, in sentence, that they
shall run consecutively, does not apply to
sentences imposed by different sovereigns.
2. Criminal Law <S=>996(1.1)
Triai court neither modified nor lengthened sentences it had earlier pronounced,
and therefore did not exceed jurisdiction by
stating sentences were to run consecutively
to those imposed in California, in response
to defendant's motion to clarify, where
court had not stated whether they were to
run concurrently or consecutively in original pronouncement.
U.C.A.1953, 76-3401(1).

WOODWARD v. WOODWARD

Utah Code Ann., 1953, § 76-3-401(1) provides: "Sentences shall run concurrently
unless the court states, in the sentence
that they shall run consecutively." This
statute speaks only to sentences imposed
by Utah courts and is silent in its application to sentences previously imposed by
sister states. However, the majority of
jurisdictions subscribe to the rule that this
type of statute does not apply to sentence!
which are imposed by two independent so?Brooke C. Wells, Salt Lake City, for de- ereigns and therefore the sentences should
fendant and appellant.
run consecutively unless the sentencing
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., J. Ste- court expressly directs otherwise. State ft
phen Mikita, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake Smith, Mo.App., 633 S.W.2d 253 (1982);
Wheeler v. Jernigan, 248 Ga. 302, 282
City, for plaintiff and respondent.
S.E.2d 891 (1981); Herman v. Brewer,
HOWE, Justice:
Iowa, 193 N.W.2d 540 (1972); Grimes ft
Greer,
223 Ga. 628, 157 S.E.2d 260 (1967).
Pursuant to a plea bargaining arrangement, defendant pleaded guilty to four The rationale behind this rule is that penal
counts of aggravated robbery and one laws are limited in their application to thi
count of second degree murder. He ap- penal system of the respective state.
peals from the trial court's ruling that his Grimes r. Greer, supra.
sentences for these convictions should be
[1,2] The district court acted properly
served consecutively to a sentence he was in clarifying defendant's sentence. TM*
then serving in California.
clarification was made at his own request
Initially, in sentencing defendant, the tri- The court neither modified nor lengthened
al court ordered that the sentences he im- the sentences it had earlier pronounced,
posed be served consecutively and not con- but only followed the general rule that
currently. However, he did not specify multiple sentences are construed as consecwhether those sentences were to be served utive when they are imposed by different
concurrently with his California sentence. sovereigns. Absent legislative enactment
to the contrary, we choose to follow that
(It is not clear that the court was aware of
rule and not accord extraterritorial effect
the California term.) After sentencing, deto section 76-3-401(1).
fendant filed a motion to clarify whether
Affirmed.
the sentences imposed were to run concurrently or consecutively with his California
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, DURHAM
sentence. The court thereupon stated that
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
the sentences were to be served consecutively to that imposed in California. Defendant now claims that the trial court
erred in three rebpects: (1) the trial court's
initial failure to make defendant's sen-
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tences consecutive to his California
^
tence entitles him to have his s e n t e n c e d
concurrently with the prior California H
tence; (2) the trial court exceeded its
^
diction by modifying the earlier senten^
it had pronounced; and (3) the trial court
exceeded its jurisdiction when it lengthened
defendant's earlier sentence.

Marvin L. WOODWARD, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
Mildred L. WOODWARD, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 20381.
Supreme Court of Utah

support, Court would presume trial court's
findings and order were supported by the
evidence; moreover, it was apparent from
limited record that husband had an annual
income of approximately $30,000, and
wife's income was only $7,000, and there
was no evidence to support husband's claim
that his income was presently inadequate
to meet children's needs.

4. Parent and Child <3=>3.1(1)
Both parents have an obligation to support their children, and a child's right to
Former husband petitioned for modifi- that support is paramount; however, it
cation of divorce decree to require former does not necessarily follow that in every
w\U- to pay child support. The First Dis- instance the noncustodial parent must pay
trict Court. Box Elder County, Ve Noy child support to the other parent; trial
ChrMoffersen. J., denied the petition, and court may fashion such equitable orders in
husband appealed. The Supreme Court relation to the children and their support as
held that iii absence of transcript of the is reasonable and necessary, considering
finance below and proper citations to the not only needs of the children, but also the
rrcord which supported a substantial ability of parent to pay. U.C.A.1953, 78chanp> of circumstance, Court would pre- 45-3, 78-45-4.
fumo that trial court's findings and order
5. Parent and Child <S»3.1(6)
wrrv supported by the evidence.
Fact that non-custodial parent is not
Affirmed
currently required to pay child support neither terminates child's right nor obviates
that parent's responsibility for such supI. Divorce c=>lf>4
To obtain modification of divorce de- port as may be determined at some future
«*«\ party seeking modification has bur- time.
den of showing substantial change of circumstance since the decree that was not
Steven R. Bailey, Ogden, for plaintiff
ortpmally contemplated within the decree
and appellant.
lUdf
Nov 4. 1985.

*. Divorce e=312.6(l, 4, 5)
In reviewing child custody and support
*Urmination in divorce proceedings, Su**nie Courts accords substantial defer• * * to trial court's findings and gives trial
•own considerable latitude in fashioning
appropriate relief; Supreme Court will not
^•turb trial court's actions unless the evin c e clearly preponderates to the contrary
e has b
een an abuse of discretion.
1

n

£ ° r c e ^309.5(3), 312.6(3)
Here former husband did not provide

* K T T C ° U r t W i t h a tr anscript of any
for m ^ , p n " J u c e d a t hearing on petition
mo<lif,Cation
f duiivrournc ,ec dUCCI
e c m Ci f wWilli;!!
hich
--- o--•>.
to require former wife to pay child

Ben Hadfield, Brigham City, for defendant and respondent.
PER CURIAM:
The plaintiff Marvin L. Woodward appeals from the denial of his motion to modify the parties' divorce decree to require the
defendant to pay child support.
The original decree awarded the plaintiff
father custody of their four children, two
girls and two boys. Our prior decision is
reported in Woodward v. Woodward. Utah,
656 P.2d 431 (1982). Subsequently, the two
daughters left the plaintiff's home to reside
with their mother, the defendant. Although
»^.. both
.„~.«.. girls
,*,-- — are
_ - - now
.. over
~ . ~ . age
-*•, ~ eigh~-^-teen, one still lives with the defendant and
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is supported by her. The two younger
children continue to live in the custody of
their father in the family home, the use of
which was awarded to him in the decree.
The plaintiff claims that because he has
custody of and supports two children while
his former spouse has none she should be
required to provide child support. According to the plaintiff, the trial court erred by
not enforcing the defendant's mandatory
obligation to pro\ide financial support for
the boys in the plaintiffs custody. The
defendant does not contend that she owes
no duty of support, but asserts that the
trial court properly exercised its broad, equitable discretion in allocating the current
financial obligations of support to the husband. We agree.
[1,2] To obtain a modification of the
divorce decree, the plaintiff has the burden
to show a substantial change of circumstance since the decree that was not originally contemplated within the decree itself.
Lea v. Bowers, Utah, 658 P.2d 1213, 1215
(1983); Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, Utah,
580 P.2d 1090 (1978). In reviewing child
custody and support proceedings, we accord substantial deference to the trial
court's findings and give it considerable
latitude in fashioning the appropriate reliefs We wITF not disturb that court's actions unless the evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary or there has been an
abuse of discretion. Christensen v. Christensen, Utah, 628 P.2d 1297 (1981);
McCrary v. MeCrary, Utah, 599 P.2d 1248
(1979). Because the facts presented to us
on appeal do not show any abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court's refusal to
find any substantial change in the circumstance of the parties which would warrant
the imposition of support payments by the
defendant.
[3] The plaintiff has not provided this
Court with a transcript of any evidence
produced at the hearing below on his petition for modification. In the absence of a
transcript of the evidence below and proper
citations to the record which support a
substantial change of circumstance, we
presume the trial court's findings and or-

der are supported by the evidence. Proudfit v. Proud/it, Utah, 598 P.2d 1318 (1979)
It is apparent from the limited record
before us that the father has an annual
income of approximately $32,000, and the
mother's income is only $7,000. The court
found that this relative disparity in the
parties' income has not significantly
changed since the divorce. Gale v. Gale
123 Utah 277, 258 P 2d 986 (1953). There
is no evidence to support the plaintiffi
claim that his income is now inadequate to
meet the two children's needs. Further
more, he continues in the use and possession of the family home, including the defendant's equity therein. The original decree awarded the plaintiff the custody and
responsibility for support of all four children. Subsequently, because the defendant assumed the support obligation for the
two girls, the plaintiff has been required to
only support the two younger children.
This change of the parties' circumstance*
was to the plaintiff's advantage and would
not support the modification the plaintiff
now seeks.
[4,5] Both parents have an obligation
to support their children. A child's right to
that support is paramount. Hills v. Hill*,
Utah, 638 P.2d 516 (1981); Uniform Civil
Liability for Support Act, U.C.A., 1958,
§§ 78-45-3, -4, as amended. However, it
does not necessarily follow that in every
instance the noncustodial parent must pay
child support to the other parent. The trial
court may fashion such equitable orders in
relation to the children and their support ••
is reasonable and necessary, considerinf
not only the nerds of the children, but also
the ability of the parent to pay. Anderson
v. Anderson, 110 Utah 300, 172 P.2d 182
(1946); U.C.A., 1953, § 30-3-5, as amended. The fact that one parent is not currently required to pay support to the other
neither terminates the child's right nor obviates that parent's responsibility for sue*
support as may be determined at son*
future time. In re C.J.U., Utah, 660 VM
237, 239 (1983).
Affirmed. No costs awarded.

SPARTAN AMC/JEEP, Plaintiff,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW OF the INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SE(TRITV and Emery C. Webster, Defendants.
No. 20413.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 4, 1985.
Discharged employee filed for unemployment benefits. Employer sought revie* of decision of Board of Review of
Industrial Commission which affirmed ruling by administrative law judge that empkn«c had not been discharged for just
cmus<» and thus was eligible for unemployment compensation. The Supreme Court,
Heme, .1, held that competent evidence supported decision.
Affirmed.
Social

of the Industrial Commission which affirmed an administrative law judge's ruling
that claimant, Webster, had not been discharged for just cause and thus was eligible for unemployment compensation. Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the Board of Review.
Because some cash had been stolen from
the
parts department
at
Spartan
AMC/Jeep, the company president, Norman Garrett, asked the parts department
employees to undergo polygraph tests.
Claimant voluntarily took the test. As a
result of the test, the polygraph examiner
told Garrett that claimant had possibly taken kickbacks from parts suppliers, in violation of company policy, and had stolen
goods from the company. The president
confronted claimant, who admitted taking
some antifreeze for use in his own automobile and some motor home cabinet doors
which he had been instructed to discard.
He denied taking money or gifts from
parts suppliers, in violation of company policy. Despite these denials, Garrett concluded that claimant was dishonest and dismissed him.

Security and Public Welfare
«=»584.5
Claimant filed for unemployment beneDecision of Board of ^Review that em- fits, and Spartan challenged any award to
ployee was discharged without just cause him. After a hearing, at which conflicting
w»d thus was eligible for unemployment testimony was presented, the administratotnpensation was supported by employee's tive law judge held that Spartan had failed
competent testimony that he had never tak- to carry its burden that claimant had been
•n incentives from parts suppliers contrary discharged for conduct which would disto company policy and that he had not qualify him for unemployment compensa**fcen supplies from the company, despite tion. U.C.A., 1953, § 35-4-5(bXD. This
rwults of polygraph test, evidenced only by ruling was upheld by the Board of Review.
fetter detailing examiner's conclusions, inOur standard of review in cases from the
dicating possibility that employee had ac«*pted kickbacks and had stolen goods Board of Review is established by statute.
"[T]he findings of . . . the board of review
'*>m employer. U.C.A.1953, 35-4-5(b)(l).
as to the facts if supported by evidence,
shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction of
Donald E. Elkins, Provo, for appellant. the court shall be confined to questions of
K. Allan Zabel, Salt Lake City, for re- law." U.C.A., 1953, § 35-4-10(i). We view
•Pondents.
the evidence in the light most favorable to
the findings and, if there is evidence of any
"OWE, Justice:
substance whatever which can be reasonA
PPellant, Spartan AMC/Jeep, seeks re- ably regarded as supporting the determina*** of a decision of the Board of Review tion of the Board of Review, we will affirm
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Frances E. BERNARD, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
John W. ATTEBURY, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 16985.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 9, 1981.
Father appealed from that portion of
consolidated order of the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Raymond S. Uno,
J. Pro Tern, which required him to pay
$2,600 to mother for child support and arrearages in support payments. The Supreme Court, Maughan, C. J., held that: (1)
trial court's decision to award one child
prospective support did not constitute a
clear error of judgment; (2) there was substantial evidence to support trial court's
finding that one child was not emancipated
from parental custody; and (3) doctrine of
res judicata could not be invoked by father
to foreclose consideration of mother's claim
for past-due child support payments.
Affirmed.
Stewart, J., concurred in the result.
1. Divorce <3=>2
The Supreme Court must apply the
laws of Utah in determining the appropriateness of imposing a duty of child support.
U.C.A.1953, 77-61a-7.
2. Parent and Child <s=*3.3(8)
While child support payments become
unalterable debts as they accrue and a periodic installment cannot be changed or modified after installment has become due, trial
court may exercise its discretion in imposing a duty of support prospectively. U.C.A.
1953, 77-£la-24.
3. Parent and Child <s=> 3.3(10)
The Supreme Court will not disturb
trial court's exercise of discretion in determining appropriateness of imposing child
support duty unless Supreme Court forms

definite and firm conviction that court below committed clear error of judgment in
conclusion it reached upon weighing of relevant factors. U.C.A.1953, 77-61a-7.
4. Parent and Child <s=»3.3(8)
Decision of trial court to award one
child prospective support, reached after
weighing of information concerning whereabouts and living situation of child, did not
constitute a clear error of judgment. U.C.
A.1953, 77-61a-7.
5. Parent and Child <s=»3.3(5)
Substantial evidence supported trial
court's decision that one child was not
emancipated from parental custody for purposes of determining child support. U.C.A.
1953, 77-61a-7.
6. Judgment <s=>634
The doctrine of res judicata renders a
final judgment, on the merits, by a court of
competent jurisdiction, conclusive upon parties and is a bar to subsequent litigation of
same issues.
7. Judgment <s=»650
Before doctrine of res judicata is applicable, final judgment embracing all issues
must be entered and preliminary or interim
rulings which do not represent final determination do not rise to dignity of res judicata.
8. Judgment e=>658
Where previous court child sup;*>rt order did not adjudicate claim of relief relate
ing to one of the parties' children and merely ordered temporary child support for the
parties' other minor child pending further
order of court, court's decree did not fulfill
requirements of rule governing judgment in
case involving multiple claims for relief and
did not constitute a final judgment; therefore, the doctrine of res judicata could not
be invoked by the father to foreclose consideration of the mother's claim for past-due
payments at subsequent hearings. Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 54(b).
Wendell P. Abies, Salt Lake City, fadefendant and appellant.

Sandra N. Peuler, Deputy Salt Lake
County Atty., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
and respondent.
MAUGHAN, Chief Justice:
The defendant appeals from that portion
of the district court's consolidated order
which requires him to pay $2,600 to the
plaintiff for child support and arrearages in
his support payments. We affirm the district court's order. All statutory references
arc to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended.
On September 7, 1976, the district court
of Sweetwater County, Wyoming, issued a
divorce decree terminating the marriage of
the plaintiff and defendant, John W. Attebury Pursuant to this decree, the plaintiff
was awarded custody of the couple's two
minor children, John David and John Joseph, and the defendant agreed to pay $250
l>er child per month for support of those
children.
Following the divorce, the children lived
with the plaintiff until October, 1977, when
John Joseph came to Salt Lake City to live
with the defendant. In March, 1978, John
David joined his brother, and the defendant, in Salt Lake City. Thereafter, the
children lived with the defendant in Utah
until December, 1978, when the plaintiff
resumed custody of them in Salt Lake City.
On December 9, 1978, John David and John
Joseph returned to Green River, Wyoming,
where they lived with friends until their
mother joined them there on January 1,
1979. The plaintiff and the two children
have lived together continually in Green
River from that time until the date of the
original hearing in this enforcement proceeding.
The plaintiff initiated the present proceedings on March 21, 1979, when she filed
a petition for support under the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act,
77 61a-1 et seq., requesting enforcement of
the Wyoming support decree. Prior to the
initial hearing in the matter which was held
on May 30, 1979, the parties entered into an
agreement stipulating to a reduction in the
required support money from $500 per

month to $300, with monthly payments of
$150 for the support of John Joseph to start
immediately. However, because of factual
questions concerning the possible emancipation of John David from the custody of the
plaintiff, the agreement reserved payment
of support for John David until that issue
could be investigated.
This agreement was to be incorporated
into the court's original order following the
May 30th hearing. However, the original
rendition of the agreement as laid out in
the court's order was incorrect and was
later amended by stipulation A corrected
order was subsequently adopted by the district court on June 8, 1979. In both the
original and amended order, the defendant
was "temporarily ordered to pay the sum of
$150 for one child . . . for the support of
John Joseph, beginning with June, 1979.
Said payments shall continue each and every month thereafter until further order of
this court." The amendment to the order
concerned the scope of an investigation to
be undertaken by the Green River County
Attorney's office for factual data relating
to the possible emancipation of John David.
Following a hearing on August 22, 1979,
the district court entered a judgment and
decree on September 5, 1979, which ordered
the defendant to pay $150 a month for the
support of John David for the months of
August, September, October and November,
1979, and thereafter cease making such
payments because of the child's eighteenth
birthday. This decree further ordered the
continuation of the payments to John Joseph and entered a judgment of $2,000,
representing past due child support. After
this hearing, a motion was submitted by the
defendant requesting the order be amended
to identify the portions of the $2,000 judgment which were attributable to each particular child.
At the August hearing, the defendant
argued the judgment entered in the prior
hearing was res judicata regarding his liability for past support payments and precluded a new judgment granting arrearages. The court expressly refused to rule on
this issue but advised the defendant he
could present it at future proceedings.
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Following a hearing on the defendant's
motion to amend the order of September 5,
1979, the court denied the defendant's motion to set aside that judgment.

[1,2] Turning to the first contention,
we are reminded of the fact that pursuant
to 77-61a-7, this court must apply the laws
of Utah in determining the appropriateness
Finally, another hearing was held and a
of imposing a duty of support.1 Thus, while
consolidated judgment entered on February
support payments become unalterable debts
22, 1980, merging all previous orders and
as they accrue and a periodic installment
judgments. This consolidated order decannot be changed or modified after the
creed that the defendant pay $150 per
installment has become due,2 the trial court
month to John Joseph, commencing on June
may exercise its discretion in imposing a
1, 1979. The decree also ordered the de- duty of support prospectively.3
fendant to pay a total amount of $600 for
In determining the appropriateness of imthe support of John David from August 1,
1979 through November 30, 1979. The or- posing a support duty, 78-45-7 outlines a
der upheld the previous judgment granting number of relevant factors which the court
the plaintiff $2,000 in arrearages divided must consider in exercising its discretion.
equally between the children which repre- Specifically, 78-45-7 provides:
sented unfulfilled payments due and owing
"(1) Prospective support shall be equal
from February through May of 1979. The
to the amount granted by the prior court
order waived support payments for John
order unless there has been a material
David for the months of June and July of
change of circumstances on the part of
1979 because of his employment during
the obligor or obligee.
those months and arranged for payment of
"(2) When no prior court order exists,
the $2,600 by installments which would run
or a material change in circumstances has
concurrently with the support payments for
occurred, the court in determining the
John Joseph.
amount of prospective support shall consider all relevant factors including, but
The district court's consolidated order
not limited to:
went on the declare:
" . . . [tjhat the defense of res judicata,
specifically that the order of May 31, fsic]
(30), 1979, was res judicata as to the
arrearages awarded in the Judgment and
Order of September 5, 1979, be and the
same is hereby determined to be not established."

"(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties;
"(b) the relative wealth and income
of the parties;
"(c) the ability of the obligor to
earn;
"(d) the ability of the obligee to
earn;

The defendant's principal contentions on
appeal are: (1) the trial court abused its
"(e) the need of the obligee;
discretion in ordering support for John
"(f) the age of the parties;
David; (2) John David is not entitled to
"(g) the responsibility of the obligor
support because he was emancipated from
for the support of others."
his mother's custody during the time in
[3] This Court will not disturb the trial
question; and (3) the order of May 30, 1979,
is res judicata and forecloses the considera- court's exercise of discretion unless we form
tion of past due support payments at subse- a definite and firm conviction that the
court below committed a clear error of
quent hearings.
judgment in the conclusion it reached upon
1. See Lamberth v. Lamberth, Utah, 550 P.2d
200 (1976).
2. Larsen v. Larsen, Utah, 56! P.2d 1077, 1079
(1977).

3. See77-61a-24. ["If the court of the responding state finds a duty of support, it may order
the respondent to furnish support or reirnbursement therefor . . . " (emphasis added)!;
see also Carter v. Carter, 19 Utah 2d 183, 429
P.2d 35 (1967).
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a weighing of the relevant factors. Therefore, if the decision were on a consideration
of the relevant factors and not based upon
irrelevant or inappropriate considerations,
this Court will not reverse the trial court's
determination unless we are convinced that
the decision amounted to a clear error of
judgment.
[4] In the present case, the proceedings
were continued several times so that information concerning the whereabouts and living situation of John David could be ascertained. It appears from the record the
trial court considered the information which
was uncovered from these investigations
and other relevant factors in making its
decision to award John David prospective
support. Because the decision reached after a weighing of these factors does not
constitute a clear error of judgment we will
not disturb the district court's decision concerning John David's right to support.
[5] Similarly, the trial court's determination that John David was not emancipated from parental custody will not be disturbed on appeal. There was substantial
evidence presented at trial to support the
trial court's decision concerning the emancipation issue and this Court will generally
not disturb the findings of the trial court
when those findings are supported by substantial, credible evidence.5
[6,7] The next contention advanced by
the defendant is that the judgment and
order which was entered by the court following the May 30, 1979, hearing is res
4. See Anderson v. Air West, Inc., 542 F.2d 522
(9th Cir. 1976); see also Ute-Cal Land Development Corp. v. Sather, Utah, 605 P.2d 1240
(1980); Terry- v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile
Institution, Utah, 605 P.2d 314 (1979).
5. Hopkins v. Wardley Corp., Utah, 611 P.2d
1204 (1980); R. C. Tolman Construction Company, Inc v. Myton Water Association, Utah,
563 P.2d 780 (1977); Town and Country Disposal, Inc. v. Martin, Utah, 563 P.2d 195 (1977).
6- Olsen v. Board of Education of the Granite
School District, Utah, 571 P.2d 1336. 1338
(1977).
7. See Richardson v. Grand Central Corporation, Utah. 572 P.2d 395, 397 (1977); In re
Town of West Jordan, 7 Utah 2d 391. 326 P.2d

judicata and precludes any further assessment of past due support payments. In
this jurisdiction, the doctrine of res judicata
renders a final judgment, on the merits, by
a court of competent jurisdiction, conclusive
upon the parties and is a bar to subsequent
litigation of the same issues.6 Before the
doctrine is applicable, however, a final
judgment embracing all the issues must be
entered and preliminary or interim rulings
which do not represent a final determination do not rise to the dignity of res judicata.7
In deciding whether the court's order of
May 30 constitutes a final judgment and as
such invokes the doctrine of res judicata we
are guided by Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, which states:
"When more than one claim for relief is
presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third
party claim, and/or when multiple parties
are involved, the court may direct the
entry of a final judgment as to one or
more but fewer than all of the claims or
parties only upon an express determination by the court that there is no just
reason for delay and upon an express
direction for the entry of judgment. In
the absence of such determination and
direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the
rights and liabilities of fewer than all of
the parties shall not terminate the action
as to any of the claims or parties, and the
105 (1958); see also C & H Construction &
Paving Co. v. Citizens Bank, 93 N.M. 150, 597
P.2d 1190 (1979); McAllister v. Charter First
Mortgage, Inc., 279 Or 279, 567 P 2d 539. 542
(1977) ["Before res judicata applies, the prior
lawsuit must have ended in an 'adjudication of
issues which have culminated in a final decree.' " Quoting from Huszar v. Certified Realty Co., 272 Or. 517, 538 P.2d 57, 60 (1975)];
American Bank of Oklahoma v. Adams, Okl.,
514 P.2d 1191 (1973); LUISI Truck Lines, Inc. v.
Washington
Utilities and
Transportation
Comm., 72 Wash.2d 887, 435 P.2d 654 (1967);
State ex rel. Adult and Family Services Division v. Copeland, 45 Or.App. 35, 607 P.2d 222
(1980).
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order or other form of decision is subject
to revision at any time before the entry
of judgment adjudicating all the claims
and the rights and liabilities of all the
parties."
[8] Because the May 30 order did not
adjudicate the claim of relief relating to
John David and merely ordered temporary
support for the couple's other minor child
pending "further order of this court," the
court's decree does not fulfill the requirements of Rule 54(b) and does not constitute
a final judgment. Therefore, the doctrine
of res judicata cannot be invoked by the
defendant to foreclose consideration of the
plaintiff's claim for past due payments at
the subsequent hearings.8
The other issues advanced by the defendant on appeal are equally without merit and
the district court's consolidated order is,
therefore, affirmed.
HALL, HOWE and OAKS, JJ., concur.
STEWART, J., concurs in the result.
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Mark WICKHAM, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
George FISHER, Weber County Sheriff,
Defendant and Respondent
No. 16322.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 22, 1981.
Former pretrial detainee appealed from
order of the Second District Court, Weber
8. Cf. Oldroyd v. McCrea, 65 Utah 142, 235 P.
580, 588 (1925); State v. Booth, 21 Utah 88, 59
P. 553 (1899); In Booth we explained; "
where the rights of the parties in an action, or a
distinct and independent branch thereof, are
determined by the court, and nothing is reserved for future determination, except what

WICKHAM v. FISHER
Cite as, Utah, 629

County, John F. Wahlquist, J., granting
partial relief in response to former detainee's petition for writ of habeas corpus attacking conditions of confinement at jaiL
The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that:
(1) former pretrial detainee had standing to
sue, even though he had moved beyond
pretrial stage; (2) inadequate space and
other conditions inimical to maintenance of
health of detainees raised issues of constitutional dimensions concerning conditions of
incarceration; (3) confinement of pretrial
detainees in overcrowded area described as
maximum security cells of county jail raised
serious constitutional issues as to detainee's
right of due process to be free from unduly
harsh and rigorous treatment; (4) failure to
provide reasonable opportunity for exercise
also imposed harsh conditions of confinement; and (5) procedures ordered by trial
court would be continued and additional
procedures ordered to be adopted, if at all
practicable.
Remanded.

1. Habeas Corpus <s=»9
Although former detainee had moved
beyond pretrial stage, where it was not
possible to adjudicate legality of conditions
complained of during period of pretrial detention, conditions at county jail giving rise
to constitutional issues remained, and there
was strong public interest in having legality
of conditions settled, former pretrial detainee had standing to sue to challenge conditions of confinement at jail. U.S.C.A.
Const. Amend. 8.
2. Action <8=»6, 13
The law does not provide exemption
from judicial scrutiny to unlawful acts
which are likely to be repeated on ground
that they do not fall within usual principles
of standing and justiciability.
may be necessary to enforce the judgment or
decision, the judgment is final." Id., 59 P. at
554. For a comprehensive review of early case
law on the question of what constitutes a final
judgment see Shurtz v. Thorley, 90 Utah 381,
61 P.2d 1262 (1936)

3. Action o=»6
Generally, actual controversy must exist at stage of appellate review, but exception to such rule allows technically mooted
controversy to be adjudicated in certain circumstances.
4. Habeas Corpus <£=»25
To accomplish end of serving constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty,
it is sufficient to invoke writ of habeas
corpus as remedy for attacking condition of
confinement that remedy be directed toward abolishing unlawful condition of confinement, as opposed to release of prisoner.
5. Prisons e=>17
Inadequate space and other conditions
of confinement inimical to maintenance of
health of pretrial detainees raised issues of
constitutional dimensions concerning conditions of incarceration.
U.S.C.A.Const.
Amends. 8, 14.
6. Prisons <3=>4(3)
Problems concerning or arising out of
internal prison administration will be addressed by courts only with reluctance and
upon showing of violations of important
rights.
7. Constitutional Law <s=> 272(2)
Criminal Law <s=»1213
Prisons and jails are not required to
provide comforts and amenities available to
one on outside world, but neither is incarceration a justification for dissolving protection of Eighth Amendment which prevents inhuman treatment of prisoners, or
due process clauses of State and Federal
Constitutions which prevent punishment of
detainee prior to adjudication of guilt. U.S.
C.A.Const. Amends. 8, 14; Const. Art. 1,
§7.
8. Prisons <s=>13(2)
Detainees do not possess full rights of
personal liberty enjoyed by persons not
charged with a crime, but conditions of
confinement are not without some constitutional limitations and are limited to measures necessary to assure their appearance
for trial and to maintain jail discipline and
security.
U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14;
Const. Art. 1, § 7.
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9. Habeas Corpus <&=>25
Confinement of pretrial detainees in
overcrowded area described as maximum
security cells of county jail raised serious
constitutional issues as to detainee's due
process right to be free from unduly harsh
and rigorous treatment. U.S.C.A.Const.
Amend. 14; Const. Art. 1, § 7.
10. Constitutional Law <s=>272(2)
County jail's failure to provide reasonable opportunity for exercise imposed harsh
conditions of confinement violative of detainee's due process right to be free from
unduly harsh and rigorous treatment. U.S.
C.A.Const. Amend. 14; Const. Art. 1, § 7.
James R. Hasenyagen, Ogden, for plaintiff and appellant.
David L. Wilkinson, Craig L. Barlow, Salt
Lake City, Robert Newey, Ogden, for defendant and respondent.
STEWART, Justice:
Petitioner Mark Wickham was a pretrial
detainee at the Weber County jail at the
time this case was at issue in the trial court.
He attacked the conditions of confinement
at the jail as being in violation of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the cruel and unusual punishment
prohibition of the Eighth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. The District Court for Weber County granted partial relief in response to Wickham's petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, and he appeals.
Wickham contends that the relief granted
by the district court is insufficient and requests this Court to order that "the place
and conditions for confinement of pretrial
detainees in the Weber County Jail facility
be brought into alignment with constitutionally mandated minimum standards
On October 26, 1978, eight pretrial detainees incarcerated on the twelfth floor of
the Weber County jail filed a pro se petition
for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the
conditions and place of their confinement.
The district court appointed counsel to rep-

